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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of public intervention on educationfinance and economic
growth in general equilibrium. I use a 3period overlapping generations model where human
capitalinvestment is risky and individuals are heterogeneous with respectto their learning
abilities. I show that subsidization of privatespending on education leads to a higher
economic growth than purepublic education in the short run if initial inequality issufficiently
low and in the long run if the dispersion of learningabilities is sufficiently low. The
determination of the politicalequilibrium shows that there can exist a conflict
betweendemocracy and economic growth.
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This 3 period overlapping generations model with altruistic individuals studies the impact of public
intervention on education ¯nance and on economic growth when individuals are distributed with respect
to their ability to learn. It examines the choice of an education regime in the case of risky human capital
investment, endogenous labor supply and positive external bene¯ts from education. The comparison between
private and public education regimes in terms of growth and income inequality has already been explored
in the literature (Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Benabou (1996)), but the case of subsidization of private
spending on education has received little attention. Gradstein and Justman (1997) introduce government
subsidies to support private education and show that economic growth is stronger under subsidization than
under private provision of education. The comparison of long-run growth under subsidization and under free
public provision does not reveal any advantage for one regime or another.
The aim of this paper is to show that a subsidized regime can lead to a higher long-run growth than
a pure public regime and a pure private regime. To do this, I extend the 2005 Zhang's model, to allow
for random ability shocks on human capital in general equilibrium. Two modes of public intervention in
education are considered: free uniform public provision and subsidization of private spending. I concentrate
on the characteristics of subsidization over pure public education and pure private education. I study the
link between economic growth and the democratic choice of an education regime and I determine the factors
that favor both economic growth and public intervention.
I show that subsidization leads to a higher long-run economic growth than free uniform public education
if individuals are weakly heterogeneous. Moreover, a con°ict between economic growth and the democratic
choice of education regime can arise. The next section sets up the model. Section 3 presents the general
equilibrium. Section 4 compares the di®erent regimes of education in terms of growth and income inequality
both in the short and the long run. Section 5 studies the political equilibrium. Section 6 concludes.
2. De¯nition of the model.
2.1. Individuals and preferences.
Consider a 3 period overlapping generations economy. Individuals make their decisions at the beginning
of their life-cycle. They are heterogeneous with respect to their inherited ability to learn ²i and are indexed
by i2 [0;1]. They inherit human capital hit from their parents. To rule out trivial steady-state equilibria,
it is supposed that hit is not zero. In the ¯rst period of their life-cycle, they accumulate human capital
hit+1 through formal schooling. In the second period, adult, middle-aged individuals allocate their unit of
time between work lit and leisure (1 ¡ lit). They earn income withitlit where wit is the wage rate, invest
in the child's education eit and save sit for old age consumption dit+1. In the third period, they retire and
consume their savings plus interest income. For simplicity reason, population growth is constant over time
or equivalently, one parent has one child. Individuals are altruistic towards their child and ± is the degree
of intergenerational altruism, or the bequest motive. In order to avoid price anticipation over all future
dynasties, I consider ad-hoc altruism. Individuals enjoy giving. They have additively logarithmic utility:
u(cit;sit;lit;hit+1) = logcit + ° logdit+1 + ´ log(1 ¡ lit) + ± loghit+1: (1)
The choice of a logarithmic function to represent preferences has several implications. First of all, savings
only depends on wages, avoiding complexity generated by interest rate in the savings function. Second, all
individuals have the same risk aversion under uncertainty. The term ´ captures the excess burden associated
with the ¯nance of public education1. Consumption of the young and old individuals are given by the
following equations:
cit + sit + eit = withitlit; (2)
dit+1 = (1 + rit+1)sit: (3)
The human capital of a child, hit+1, depends on learning abilities ²i and on individual and average spending





1Gradstein and Justman (1997) assume that the excess burden varies directly with the taste for leisure.
1with 0 < ®+¯ < 1. Let superscript (p) denote pure private provision of education, (g) free uniform public
provision of education and (z) subsidization of education. Under private provision, education expenditures






itlp where µp is the share of income that parent (i) chooses to allocate to the
education of his child. Under free uniform public provision, the government sets a uniform level of spending
on education: e
g






t is the tax rate and h
g
t = ht is the average human capital. Under
subsidization, private provision is supported by a subsidy at the proportional rate z which is ¯nanced by a





2.2. Production and distribution.
It is assumed that the initial distribution of human capital2 is lognormal, of mean ¹i0 and variance ¾2
i0.
Learning abilities are also lognormal and independently distributed in each generation with mean zero and
variance ¾2
² = Á2. The distribution of abilities in each generation is constant over time, independent of
the initial distribution of human capital ©i0(hi0), and is not correlated across generations. Average human




htd©t(ht) = exp(¹t + ¾2
t): (5)





= expÁ2, with mean ¹² = 0. Firms produce a single
good with physical capital Kt and labor de¯ned in e±ciency units Lt. Physical capital totally depreciates




t , with 0 < ´ < 1










t ¡(1+rt)Kt¡wtLt. Under perfect competition, factors are paid to their marginal product. Pro¯t
maximization leads to the following wage rate per units of e®ective labor and interest rate:
wt ´ w(kt) = A(1 ¡ ')k
'
t ; (6)
1 + rt ´ 1 + r(kt) = A'k
'¡1
t : (7)
Denoting ¸t(st) the distribution of savings st, the equilibrium condition on capital market (and the dynamics





Physical capital depends on the distribution of savings.
3. The determination of general equilibrium.
The aim of this Section is to compare the optimal allocation of resources under subsidization and under
pure private regime, then under subsidization and under free uniform public regime. The results are presented
in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1.
(i) Comparing subsidization (z) and pure private provision of education (p) allows to show that the
share of income devoted to education is always higher under subsidization over time (µz=z > µp), if there
are external bene¯ts from education (¯ > 0). The optimal labor supplies are equal under both subsidized and
private regimes (lz = lp).
(ii) Comparing subsidization (z) and free uniform public education (g) allows to show that the optimal
labor supply is always higher under subsidization over time (lz > lg), and that the share of national income
allocated to education is the same under free uniform education and under subsidization (µz=z = µg) .
The Proof is presented in the 3 following Sections.
2Galor and Tsiddon (1997) use a general distribution for human capital.
23.1. The private education regime.
I ¯rst consider the case of pure private education. All middle-aged individuals choose the same allocation
of time between work and leisure. They also choose the same spending on education, since they have the
same risk aversion. The human capital of a child is de¯ned by:
h
p








Solving the concave program of a parent de¯ned by (1), (2), (3) and (4), I obtain the optimal labor supply:
lp = (1 + ° + ±®)=[(1 + ° + ´ + ±®)] and the optimal share of income devoted to education: µp = ±®=[(1 +








s = ° (1 ¡ µp)lp = °(1+°)=[1+° +´ +±®]




















3.2. The pure public education regime.
Under free uniform public provision, middle-aged individuals determine individually the optimal labor












All individuals prefer the same optimal tax rate de¯ned by: µg = ±(®+¯)=[(1+° +±(®+¯))]. The optimal
tax rate µg is higher than the optimal share of income devoted to education under the private regime, as it
depends positively on the magnitude of the learning externality (¯). The optimal labor supply is de¯ned by:
lg = (1+´)=(1+° +´), and is lower than under the private regime, as lp depends positively on the bequest
motive (±) and on the elasticity of individual spending on education (®). This is due to the transformation
















s = °(1 + °)=[(1 + ° + ´)(1 + ° + ±(® + ¯))].
3.3. The subsidized education regime.
Let us consider that a subsidy (z) supports private education. The subsidy is ¯nanced by a proportional
income tax µz. Middle-aged individuals vote on the subsidy and individually decide on the allocation of time
between labor and leisure. The human capital of a child is de¯ned by:
hz






The parents choose the same allocation of time between work and leisure than under the private regime.
The optimal labor supply is the same than under the private regime. Therefore, it is higher than under free
uniform provision: (lz = lp > lg). The optimal share of national income allocated to education is the same
than under free uniform provision as it is also chosen by majority voting: (µz=z)= µg. It is then higher than











s = °(1 + ° + ±®)=[(1 + ° + ´ + ±®)(1 + ° + ±(® + ¯))].
4. The growth rates, the steady-state human capital and the evolution of inequality.
4.1. The mean and dispersion of human capital.
This subsection studies the distribution of human capital under each regime. Denote the mean of log(ht)
by ¹t. Under subsidization, the dynamics of the mean are given by the following expression:
¹z
t+1 = !z + '(® + ¯)logkz
t + (® + ¯)¹z
t + ¯¾2
t=2; (12)
where !z = (® + ¯)log((µz=z)lzA(1 ¡ ')) captures the e®ect of the control variables on mean and average
human capital 3. The dynamics of the variance are given by:
¾2
t+1 = ®2¾2




3For Benabou (1996), the control variables of the human capital technology capture both the optimal allocation of resources
and the private incentives to invest in education.
3where ¾2
1 = Á2=(1 ¡ ®2) is the variance in any steady states. Using (4) and (5), the growth rate of average





t = expf!z +
Á
2
2 + '(® + ¯)logkz
t ¡ (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)logh
z





Under subsidization, inequality has a direct negative e®ect on the growth rate of average human capital4 as
the human capital of a child is increasing and concave in the parental human capital (® < 1). Under the pure
public regime, inequality is de¯ned by the dispersion of abilities, ¾2
t = Á2, which is stable over time. The





t = expf!g +
Á
2
2 + '(® + ¯)logk
g
t ¡ (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)logh
g
tg: (15)





t = expf!p +
Á
2
2 + '(® + ¯)logk
p
t ¡ (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)logh
p





The stochastic components of average human capital dynamics are similar under subsidization and under
pure private education. Inequalities are independent of the rate of subsidization of private education.
4.2. Growth rates and short run comparison.
This subsection is dedicated to the comparison of economic growth under alternative regimes in the short
run. I study the characteristics of the subsidized regime over the pure private regime and the free uniform
public regime. I ¯rst compare subsidization with pure private provision of education. I use the converging
geometric sequence5:


















Using (4) and the expressions of education spending in Subsection 2.1, the growth rate di®erential can be
rewritten as follows:
ª1(z;p) = (® + ¯)(log(µz=z) ¡ log(µp)): (18)
As initial inequality is the same under both regimes, ª1(z;p) depends on the tax di®erential as labor supplies
are equal under both regimes (lz = lp). Due to Proposition 1, the share of income devoted to education
is higher under subsidization than under pure private provision if there are positive external bene¯ts from
education (¯ > 0). This ensures that ª1(z;p) is positive. Subsidization leads to a higher growth than pure
private provision in the short run as ª1(z;p) is positive over time. Moreover, di®erentiating ª1(z;p) shows
that the advantage of subsidization over pure private provision in terms of growth increases with the external
bene¯ts from education (¯) but decreases with the bequest motive (±). I then compare subsidization with
free uniform public provision. Using the geometric sequence, the growth rate di®erential is de¯ned by:

































For every value of ¾2
0 lower than e ¾2
0, subsidization leads to a higher growth than free uniform provision.
Di®erentiating ª1(z;g), the advantage of subsidization over free uniform provision in the short run increases
with the externality (¯), the bequest motive (±) and the excess burden (´). In the short run, a large saving
motive (°) increases the advantage of subsidization over private provision and reduces the advantage of
subsidization over free uniform provision. Collecting the results leads to the following proposition:
4See Guaitoli (2000) for a formal analysis of the negative e®ects of inequality on the accumulation of human capital.
5See Gradstein and Justman (1997) for further information about the properties of this sequence.
4Proposition 2.
(i) The comparison of subsidization (z) with pure private provision of education (p) shows that subsidiza-
tion (z) always lead to a higher economic growth in the short run. The advantage of subsidization in terms
of growth increases with the external e®ect (¯) and decreases with the bequest motive (±).
(ii) The comparison of subsidization (z) with free uniform public provision of education (g) shows that
subsidization (z) leads to a higher economic growth in the short run if initial inequality (¾2
0) is su±ciently
low (lower than a positive threshold). The advantage of subsidization in terms of growth increases with the
external e®ect (¯), the bequest motive (±) and the excess burden (´).
Remark 1. The comparison of private provision with free uniform provision shows that a large inequality
















while the e®ect of (¯) is ambiguous and a large (±) favors the private provision
of education.
Proof: see the Appendix.
4.3. The steady-state levels of human capital and physical capital per e®ective worker.
This subsection studies the characteristics of subsidization over the private regime and the free uniform
public regime in the long run. The balanced growth path is characterized by a unique steady-state growth rate
for both physical capital and human capital, as well as a stationary variance ¾2
1. Let us denote ght = ht+1=ht
the growth rate of average human capital. The balanced growth path satis¯es the following condition:
gKt=ght=g1. Using (14), the steady state of average human capital ht under subsidization is given by:
h
z











s + log(1 ¡ ') ¡ logl
¢
=(1 ¡ ') is the steady-state physical capital per e®ective
worker6. Under free uniform provision, the steady state is de¯ned by:
h
g





2 ]g=(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯): (22)
Under pure private provision, the steady state is de¯ned by:
h
p





2(1+®)]g=(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯): (23)






























Di®erentiating ª1 (z;p) shows that the advantage of subsidization over pure private provision increases
in the long run when the bequest motive (±) decreases and the saving motive (°) increases. The sign of
the derivative of ª1 (z;p) with respect to (¯) depends on some speci¯c parameter values. The e®ect of
external bene¯ts from education on ª1 (z;p) is then ambiguous. The excess burden has no e®ect on the
growth di®erential as ª1 (z;p) does not depend on the optimal labor supply. The bequest motive is more
important under the pure private regime than under subsidization, where each individual receives a share
of national income to support private education. I then compare growth rates under subsidization and free
uniform provision. I de¯ne ª1 (z;g) as follows:





































6The determination of the steady states is given in the Appendix
5For every value of Á2 lower than e Á2, subsidization generates a higher economic growth than free uniform
public provision in the long run7. Di®erentiating ª1 (z;g) shows that the advantage of subsidization over
free uniform education increases with the learning externality (¯), the bequest motive (±) and the excess
burden (´). It decreases with the saving motive (°) and the dispersion of abilities
¡
Á2¢
. The excess burden
of funding education is more important under the free uniform public regime because spending on education
is supported by government. Each individual receives an equal share of average income. Income tax raised to
fund education bene¯ts individuals with income below average. This generates an excess burden which in turn
reduces the optimal labor supply (lg < lz = lp). The free uniform regime generates a larger excess burden
than subsidization. The resulting distribution of the cost of education under free uniform public provision
is less costly for any individual with income above the average. Both ª1 (z;p) and ª1 (z;g) also increase
with the elasticity of physical capital ('). In the long run, a large saving motive (°) favors subsidization
over private provision while it mitigates the advantage of subsidization over free uniform provision. A large
bequest motive (±) favors private provision over public intervention, as the weight of the bequest motive on
the balanced growth path is more important when education is provided privately.
Proposition 3.
(i) In the long run, the subsidization of private education (z) leads to a higher economic growth than free
uniform public provision (g) if the dispersion of abilities in the population
¡
Á2¢
is su±ciently low (lower than
a positive threshold).
(ii) The comparison of subsidization (z) with pure private provision, (p) shows that the advantage of
subsidization in terms of economic growth decreases with the bequest motive (±), increases with the saving
motive (°), and does not depend on the excess burden (´). An increase in the positive external bene¯ts from
education (¯) does not necessary favor subsidization over private provision in terms of growth.
(iii) The comparison of subsidization (z) with free uniform public provision (g) shows that the advantage
of subsidization in terms of growth increases with the bequest motive (±), the external bene¯ts from education
(¯), and the excess burden (´), while it decreases with the saving motive (°).
Remark 2. The comparison of pure private provision with free uniform provision depends on some speci¯c


























It is an increasing function of the bequest motive (±) and the excess burden (´). The impact of the positive
learning externality (¯) and of the saving motive (°) are ambiguous.
Proof: See the Appendix.
5. The democratic choice of education and the economic growth.
This subsection studies the mode of public intervention which can emerge in a democratic society. The
education regime is determined by majority voting and the preferences of the median voter are decisive.
To characterize the factors that favor the choice of subsidization over free uniform provision, I compare
the indirect utility under each regime. Denote uz
m0 and u
g
m0 the indirect utility of the median voter under
subsidization and under free uniform provision in period (t = 0). Under subsidization, the indirect utility
depends on median and mean human capital:
uz
m0 = (1 + °)logcz
0 + ° log° + ´ log(1 ¡ lz
0) + ± (® + ¯)log!z + ±®loghm0 + ±¯ logh0: (28)
Under free uniform provision, the indirect utility depends on the mean:
u
g
m0 = (1 + °)logc
g
0 + ° log° + ´ log(1 ¡ l
g
0) + ± (® + ¯)log!g + ±(® + ¯)logh0: (29)
7Our results di®ers from Vidal and Brauninger (2000) who show that pure public education leads to a higher long-run growth
than a subsidized private education regime
6In order to choose between the two education regimes, the median voter considers the following utility
di®erential: d(z;g)m0 = uz
m0 ¡ u
g
m0. Following the results in Proposition 1 and (4), (11), (12) and (13),
d(z;g)m0 is de¯ned by:






























Along the steady state path, the variance satis¯es the following condition: ¾2
0 = ¾2
1 = Á2=(1 ¡ ®2). The
median voter prefers free public provision over subsidization if the utility di®erential is negative:
Á2=2 < (1 ¡ ®2)
n



















Subsidization is adopted if the dispersion of abilities is su±ciently low. Moreover, di®erentiation of (30)
shows that the utility di®erential is an increasing function of the learning externality (¯) and the bequest
motive (±). It is also a decreasing function of the dispersion of abilities
¡
Á2¢
. Following Proposition 2 and
Proposition 3, the deterministic factors that favor both the preference of the median voter for subsidization
and the advantage of subsidization over free uniform provision in terms of growth are a large external e®ect
(¯) and a large bequest motive (±). While a rise in (´) favors subsidization over free uniform provision in
terms of growth, it is not certain that it would increase the preference of the median voter for subsidized
education. An increase in (´), or equivalently, in the e±ciency cost of raising taxes to fund public education,
has an ambiguous e®ect on the utility di®erential. This can generate a con°ict between the democratic choice
of education provision and economic growth. Proposition 4 collects all the results.
Proposition 4.
(i) A large external e®ect (¯), a large bequest motive (±) and a small dispersion of abilities in the population ¡
Á2¢
favor both the preference of the median voter for subsidization (z) over free uniform public provision (g)
and economic growth.
(ii) The comparison of subsidization (z) with free uniform public provision (g) shows that an increase in
the excess burden (´) has a positive e®ect on the growth di®erential but an ambiguous e®ect on the utility
di®erential. This results in a possible con°ict between the democratic choice of an education regime and
economic growth.
Proof: see the Appendix.
6. Concluding remarks.
This paper shows that the subsidization of private education leads to a higher economic growth than free
uniform public provision in the short run if initial inequality is low and in the long run if individuals are
weakly heterogeneous in terms of learning abilities. Subsidization also leads to a higher growth than pure
private provision in the short run. In the long run, a su±ciently low dispersion of abilities favors subsidization
over pure private provision. Large external bene¯ts from education and a strong bequest motive favor both
economic growth and the preference of the median voter for subsidies over free public education. A con°ict
between economic growth and the democratic choice of an education regime can arise if there is an increase
in the size of the excess burden. While this favors subsidization in terms of economic growth, it does not
necessarily strengthen the preference of the median voter for subsidies over free uniform public provision. A
low dispersion of abilities is also necessary for subsidization to emerge as the preferred education regime.
7Appendix: Proofs of Proposition 2, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4:
1. Proof of Proposition 2 and proof of Proposition 3
In this Appendix I show how I obtain the expressions that allow to compare each regime in terms of growth
and inequality. Let us Denote kt = Kt=lht the ratio of physical capital to e®ective labor, gKt = Kt+1=Kt
the growth rate of physical capital and ght = ht+1=ht the growth rate of average human capital. I consider




itd¸it. Using the expression of



















s = °(1 ¡ µz=z)lz=(1 + °) captures the impact of the control variables on savings. Dividing (32) by
Kz









Taking logs, I obtain the following expression:
log(gKz
t ) = log(Kz
t+1=Kz
t ) = logvz
s + logA(1 ¡ ') ¡ logl ¡ (1 ¡ ')logkz
t: (34)
I study the balanced growth path. Imposing gKz
t = gh
z
it = g1 in (34) and in (14) in Subsection 4.1 leads to




s + logA(1 ¡ ') ¡ loglg: (35)
Plugging the expression of log(kz
1) into (14), I obtain the steady-state average human capital h
z
1 in (21).
The steady-state average human capital can be rewritten as:
h
z
1 = expf[!z +
'(®+¯)
1¡' (logvz
s + logA(1 ¡ ') ¡ logl) +
Á
2
2(1+®)]=(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)g: (36)
The optimal allocation of resources is given by:
!z = [(® + ¯)log(±(® + ¯)(1 + ° + ±®)(1 + °)A(1 ¡ '))]=[(1 + ° + ±(® + ¯))]: (37)
Similarly, the steady-state average human capital under free uniform public education is obtained by plugging
log(kg
1) into (15) and the steady-state average human capital under private education is obtained by plugging
log(kp
1) into (16). This leads to (22) and (23) in Subsection 4.3. The optimal allocation of resources under
free uniform public provision is de¯ned by:
!g = [(® + ¯)log(±(® + ¯)A(1 ¡ ')(1 + °)]=[(1 + ° + ±(® + ¯)(1 + ° + ´)]; (38)
and the optimal allocation of resources under private provision is given by:
!p = [(® + ¯)log(±®(1 ¡ ')]=[(1 + ° + ´ + ±®))]: (39)















0 = h0, using (14), (15), (16), (17)
and Proposition 1, (18) and (19) can be rewritten as:






























First of all, straightforward calculations allow to verify the results in Proposition 2 (i) and (ii). Second,
di®erentiating both expressions with respect to (¯), (°), (±), and (Á2) allows to show that: @ª1(z;p)=@¯ > 0,
@ª1(z;p)=@± < 0, @ª1(z;p)=@° > 0 and @ª1(z;g)=@¯ > 0, @ª1(z;g)=@± > 0, @ª1(z;g)=@° < 0 and
8@ª1(z;g)=@´ > 0. The comparison of pure private education and free uniform education depends on the
following expressions:





















Di®erentiating ª1(p;g) with respect to the parameters leads to the statements in Remark 1. I turn to the





































Straightforward calculation allows to verify the results in Proposition 3 (i). Di®erentiating both expressions
leads to the results of Proposition 3 (ii) and (iii): @ª1(z;p)=@± < 0, @ª1(z;p)=@° > 0 and @ª1(z;g)=@¯ >
0, @ª1(z;g)=@± > 0, @ª1(z;g)=@° < 0 and @ª1(z;g)=@´ > 0. The learning externality (¯) favors
subsidization over private provision in the short run. In the long run, its impact is ambiguous as the sign
of @ª1(z;p)=@¯ depends on some speci¯c parameter values. The comparison of private provision and free



























Di®erentiation of growth rate di®erential leads to the statements of Remark 2.
2. Proof of Proposition 4.
Let us denote cz
0 = ° ((1 ¡ µz
0=z)w0h0lz
0)=(1 + °) the optimal consumption subsidization and c
g
0 =




0)=(1 + °) the optimal consumption under free uniform public regime. Using lz
0 = (1 +
° + ±®)=(1+ ° + ±® +´) and l
g
0 = (1+ °)=(1+ ° + ´), and noting that µz
0=z = µ
g
0, I obtain the expression of
the utility di®erential d(z;g)m0 = uz
m0 ¡ u
g
m0. I rewrite (30) as:





















Di®erentiating (46) gives the results of Proposition 4 (i): @d(z;g)m0=@¯ > 0, @d(z;g)m0=@± > 0, and
@d(z;g)m0=@Á2 < 0. Di®erentiation of (46) also reveals that the sign of d(z;g)m0=@° and the sign of
@d(z;g)m0=@´ depend on some speci¯c parameter values. The e®ect of a rise in (´) on the utility di®er-
ential is ambiguous. This leads to the result of Proposition (4) (ii).
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